Electric Reliability: How PJM Tripped on Gas-fired Plants

Fortnightly Magazine - May 1 1995
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Just after the sun rose on January 19, 1994, the mercury fell to new record low temperatures. Lights went out, furnaces shut off, and computer screens went blank in parts of Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Virginia, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania. The 11 electric utilities that compose the PJM power pool had begun rolling blackouts (em the first ever in winter, and the first since the summer of 1970.

Looking back at this extraordinary event reveals that much of the ensuing conventional wisdom about the rolling blackouts of 1994 is wrong. Looking back also provides valuable insight into the future of the electric industry as customer choice reshapes it.

The multistate PJM power pool was formed to increase reliability and efficiency through central and economic dispatch of the pool's 57,626 megawatts (MW) of installed capacity. Economic dispatch saved consumers millions of dollars. But the pooling of capacity made electric service so reliable that too many people took it for granted. It was, then, a shock to discover on January 19 that the PJM operators could not meet the morning peak of 40,554 MW. The five Pennsylvania electric utilities in PJM experienced the greatest difficulty in meeting demand. At the urging of the Pennsylvania Commission, the governor declared a state of emergency.

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