The Florida Public Service Commission (PSC) has found that the state's long-distance telecommu-nications market is
sufficiently competitive to permit equal levels of regulation for AT&T...
on sabbatical at Harvard University. The author thanks Michael Clements and Jaison Abel of the NRRI staff for survey data for the telecommunications and electric industries, respectively. He also thanks various senior staff at the cited utility commissions for information regarding electric and natural gas cases.
Comments presented in the Illinois case, as characterized by the commission.*
Illinois Power indicates that the exclusive sharing of corporate support information, services, and personnel between a utility and its affiliated interests will not impact the competitive balance.
Commonwealth Edison asserts that the ban on joint marketing adversely affects legitimate competition and innovation.
MidAmerican Energy asserts that denial of the right of utilities and their affiliated interests to share corporate support services makes them less efficient and places them at a competitive disadvantage.
Nicor Gas states that joint marketing and sales activities by utilities and their affiliates utilize economies of scope and scale, result in cost savings to consumers, and reflect [the] customer's desire for one-stop shopping.
Edison Electric Institute states that requiring utility sharing of non-tariffed services [with unaffiliated entities] attempts to socialize the economies of integration that inherently are a part of any business organization.
* Petition for Rulemaking on Nondiscrimination in Affiliate Transactions for Electric Utilities, 98- 0013, 98-0035, order of Sept. 14, 1998.
Abel, Jaison R. and Michael E. Clements, "Should Utility Incumbents Be Able to Extend Their Brand Name to Competitive Retail Markets? An Economic Perspective,"
The Electricity Journal, June 1998, Vol. 11, No. 5, p. 49-57.
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Pashigian, Peter and Brian Bowen, "The Rising Cost of Time of Females, the Growth of National Brands, and the Supply of Retail Services," Economic Inquiry 32(1), January 1994, pg. 33-65.
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Schmalensee, Richard, "Brand Loyalty and Barriers to Entry," Southern Economic Review 40, 1974, pg. 579-588.
Shepherd, William G., The Economics of Industrial Organization, 4th Edition, Prentice Hall, Saddle River, NJ, 1997.
Thomas, Louis A., "Brand Capital and Incumbent Firm's Positions in Evolving Markets," Review of Economics and Statistics 77(3), August 1995, pg. 522-534.
*Assembled with grateful assistance from Jaison R. Abel, NRRI staff.
1 Competition Handbook, Chapter 5, Negotiation and Arbitrations, 5.1 AT&T Arbitration Scoreboard, October 13, 1997.
2 Citations not given for the references that follow in the