Nuclear fuel cost projections typically consist of current reported costs that are escalated at the rate of inflation. These projections usually consist of a single estimate in each year. In the...
The Blue Ribbon Commission’s best answer for the nuclear waste dilemma.
power plants, favors the fedcorp model (See “Rethinking Spent Fuel,” February 2011) . Some prominent state regulators are on the record supporting a fedcorp, including Michigan Public Service Commissioner Greg White; and of course the current chairman of the House Energy Committee co-sponsored the Voinovich bill.
However, by itself, a federal corporation structure shouldn’t be considered any guarantee of success, as the failures and foibles of some federal entities have illustrated. The U.S. SynFuels Corp. of the early 1980s provides an instructive example. The project to produce synthetic fuels, primarily from coal, lost its mission when its primary driving force vanished— i.e., the energy crisis ended, and petroleum prices dropped below the cost of the new fuels to be produced. And another example, Amtrak, continually suffers from the uncertainties of annual congressional appropriations.
There are, however, successful examples of corporations created as public entities with policy direction from Congress, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) or more recently the U.S. Enrichment Corp. (USEC)—which was formed by the federal government in the early 1990s, and privatized in 1998.
Both successful and unsuccessful examples provide useful lessons. Several key steps stand out as being critically important in the effort to create a successful fedcorp to manage spent nuclear fuel.
Step 1: Policy Mandate
A central question for any new government corporation involves resolving how policy is set, and what functions and responsibilities accrue to the entity. In short, would the fedcorp be expected to craft policy on managing spent fuel, or would it receive such policy from the government?
Jack Bailey, TVA’s director of nuclear operations, argues that Congress and the administration—and not the board of a nuclear fedcorp—must bear the responsibility to establish America’s spent-fuel policy.
“We wouldn’t advocate that this fedcorp in any way establish policy,” Bailey says. “They are merely a tool to implement policy. That direction comes from the administration or the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, or some other legislative vehicle to establish overall policy.”
Bailey does, however, specify functions to be carried out by the fedcorp. “The [fedcorp’s] board—and the management that it would hire—need the flexibility to implement policy as best they see fit, and to manage the money that’s put into the fund in a way that’s most efficient toward achieving the results of the corporation.”
In other words, the fedcorp’s mandate should be firmly established—but it should also give the fedcorp the flexibility it needs to get the job done right.
Step 2: An Independent Board
Like any successful corporation, a nuclear waste fedcorp would need strong governance and management expertise. “The board structure needs to include people who understand business,” Bailey says. “It can’t all be political appointees, for example, who have really no knowledge or interest in the business.”
Additionally the fedcorp board should include representation from major stakeholder groups, who will ensure the corporation is directed and managed in an independent way. According to Bailey, TVA has been most successful “when the board has had the ability to act on behalf of its mission without having to worry about a lot