It was a "classic" publicity event-long on vision, but short on substance. There he was, the Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE), Spencer Abraham, standing toe-to-toe with each of the...
Entergy's Grid Grab
Will tomorrow's transmission be privately funded, with the first-class seats reserved for investors?
bound to fail."
McDiarmid also rails against Entergy's proposed 16 percent return on equity for regional expansion projects-a 13 percent rate, plus a 3 percent incentive bonus.
"[T]his filing proposes a 13 percent return on equity," adds McDiarmid, plus an "entirely unsubstantiated additional 3 percent, or 16 percent return on equity when the transco ... has to wake up and actually do something to justify its existence. ... The motto seems to be, 'Bribe Me.'"
Many others dislike Entergy's proposed 16 percent ROE. They question other parts of the rate design-many more features than can be described here. Such features include the performance-based rate adjustments for service interruptions and voltage fluctuations. The proposal also calls for a three-year initial period of carte blanche cost recovery (the so-called "exact recovery mechanism"). Entergy says its needs the ERM because it lacks a track record for transco operations, making it difficult to construct a baseline to guide regulators in reviewing expenses.
But for me, the most interesting aspect of Entergy's rate plan is the notion of privately financed transmission expansion. Entergy's tariff calls them "participant-funded investments." And the investors would retain benefits, subject to a 5 percent commission paid to Entergy. That's better than getting naming rights for a new sports stadium. In his testimony filed at the FERC, consultant Michael Schnitzer explained the concept behind privately funded grid expansions.
"THE BASIC CONCEPT IS THAT PARTIES WHO VOLUNTARILY CHOOSE TO FUND GRID EXPANSIONS RECEIVE, IN RETURN, ALL THE LONG-TERM RIGHTS." According to Entergy and Schnitzer, the scheme is necessary because of the way some grid expansions may devalue certain congestion management hedges, or generation at certain specific locations.
"Participant-funded expansion, where possible, is more likely to produce the 'right' level of transmission investment," says Schnitzer. "With respect to generation, FERC policies in most instances favor having these key judgments made by market participants, risking their own capital."
Schnitzer explains how Entergy would take back a 5 percent cut as compensation, which it could distribute to other grid users:
"Entergy will be proposing an incentive on participant-funded expansions. This will take the form of a share of the value of the rights created by the expansion, or, where appropriate, a development fee. The 'shared value' incentive will provide [the Entergy transco] with up to 5 percent of the transmission rights created by the expansion. [The] transco will not hold these transmission rights, but will auction them off."
As I see it, with generation a merchant business, the power producers certainly will demand control over all elements of production. That includes transmission capacity, which can dictate locational power prices and market values for generating plants.
In fact, when the economists first toyed with locational marginal pricing for generation, I'm sure they never dreamed they were sewing the seeds for a privatized transmission grid, but that result now appears inevitable.
"There is nothing inherently wrong or bad," adds Schnitzer, "about this interaction between transmission expansion and generation value-it is a fact. But it does mean that ... investors in competitive generation—existing and new—have a legitimate interest in transmission