While NAESB and NERC struggle over the issue, North America steadily drifts toward unreliability.
- reserve/control cost (discussed later) is many times that. The energy value for the Eastern Interconnection is derived from an average frequency error of 11.76 mHz converted to 353 MW. That's a "variance" of 3532. Divided by a simplifying assumption of 20 large BAs, that's 6,230 MW2 per BA, or a mean absolute error of 79 x .85=67 MW per BA. Times 20 BAs, times the hours in a year, times $25 per MWh, we get $293 million. This calculation was suggested by Howard Illian. The Western Interconnection is a quarter the size of the Eastern with fewer BAs and a smaller average frequency error, while ERCOT is less than half the size of the Western Interconnection with one BA and double the frequency error of the Eastern Interconnection. Utilities typically value reserve for control operations at nearly 20 percent of capital cost.
- The NERC JIITF actually decomposed the energy price into an uncongested price and a "transmission loading component" price for congestion, with both prices usually combinable into a single locational energy price. It is not the role of inadvertent interchange pricing to mandate the formation of markets for scheduled energy or congestion, but simply to use whatever local/native scheduled-energy price/cost information is available to settle the energy component of inadvertent interchange.
- Inadvertent interchange must be priced when performance is inside the CPS1 limit. Otherwise, once the energy component is priced, there's no incentive to help frequency, nor disincentive from hurting frequency, by scheduling or not within the range CPS1 allows for unscheduled power, and there's a disincentive from providing governor response that limits the amount of frequency error per megawatt of aggregate scheduling error on the system. (The steady decline in governor response in the North American interconnections since deregulation has been documented in .) Unless inadvertent interchange is subject to compliance-driven pricing/settlement, then everyone allows the amount of frequency error per megawatt to increase to the point where everyone drifts toward the edge of the allowable performance range (where compliance becomes increasingly expensive) and average frequency error continues having a tendency as it has today, when it should have no tendency: drifting toward the upper bound of its CPS1 limit (±18 mHz on the Eastern Interconnection, ±30 mHz in ERCOT).
- All FCC shares the price of getting compliant with CPS1. If all BAs are near their CPS1 limits enabling one BA to tip the entire interconnected system over the frequency limit, then the FCC of the inadvertent interchange of all the BAs that put the interconnected system near the frequency limit should be assessed the price the tipping BA had to pay to bring his performance into CPS1 compliance.
- While FCC is a one-month average, it is decomposable to an hourly amount thus:
- The CPS1 equation. BA i's bias obligation 10Bi is to instantaneously respond to (mainly by governor action) and contain a given amount of frequency error DF by instantly providing a given amount of megawatts in the opposite direction determined by 10BiDF, which is a negative number times the frequency error.
- The CPS1 equation can be rearranged (per