As federal policy makers push for GHG regulation and transparent markets, the California experience shows what works and what doesn’t work.
Stabilizing California's Demand
The real reasons behind the state’s energy savings.
Program No. 1134-04 SCE0224.01 by Quantec Consulting found very high noncompliance rates for residential building measures updated per California’s Title 24 standard. http://www.calmac.org/. Appliance standard compliance rates are easier to estimate because: (1) appliance standards set dates for changes in appliance manufacturing and stocking; and (2) appliance turnover rates can be tracked through retail sales data (with additional consideration needed on whether the replaced appliance enters a secondary market).
26. Data supplied by CEC.
27. http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/Published/proceedings/R060410.htm, Decision 07-10-032 , Oct. 18, 2007, Commission Discussion, page 21: “TURN [The Utility Reform Network] correctly notes that an emphasis on measures with savings that decay quickly creates a ‘treading water effect’ whereby the measures are replaced in the next portfolio cycle with little development towards sustainability programs that do not require continual reinvestments of ratepayer funds.”
28. http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/electric/Energy+Efficiency/EM+and+V/081117_Verification+Report.htm, CPUC EE 2006-2007, Verification Report Review Draft prepared by Energy Division Feb. 5, 2009.The California utilities (Pacific Gas & Electric, Southern California Edison, San Diego Gas and Electric, and Southern California Gas) reported 2006 and 2007 EE accomplishments that collectively the utilities had achieved almost 130 percent of the CPUC’s electric goal and over 110 percent of the CPUC’s gas goal. In contrast, the CPUC’s Energy Division Staff has reached a significantly different conclusion on California IOUs’ 2006 and 2007 EE accomplishments. Per the CPUC’s utility incentive mechanism based on a sharing between ratepayers and shareholders of the net benefits, the California IOUs claimed they were due a shareholder incentive of $236 million. Per the Energy Division’s February 5, 2009 Interim Claim Report , the California IOUs are collectively at only 78% percent of the CPUC’s combined electric and natural gas goals. On an individual basis, the thee electrics are entitled to zero shareholder incentives, with SoCalGas entitled to $2.89 million. www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Energy+Efficiency/EM+and+V/081117_Verification+Report.htm. CPUC Decision 08-12-059 dated Dec. 18, 2008 authorized interim payments based on utility submitted performance reports subject to a 65 percent holdback pending the results of Energy Division’s ex post measurement and verification results. http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/Published/proceedings/R0604010.htm.
29. See Program Elements Attachment A: PG&E, SCE, SDG&E, SCG, Sept. 22, 2000; and CALMAC Public Workshops on PY 2001 EE Programs: Day 1 & 2, Sept. 12 and 13, 2000, Day 3 & 4, Sept. 19 and 20, 2000. California Measurement Advisory Council (CALMAC) Workshop Report 9/25/2000 Proposed NTG Ratios for PY2001. http://www.calmac.org.
30. Analysis of savings data supplied by the CEC and savings goals data in CPUC, Interim Opinion: Energy Savings Goals for Program Year 2006 and Beyond, Decision 04-09-060 , Sept. 29, 2004, Table 1E .
31. The utilities forecast of savings as shown in Figure 7 is more robust than the CPUC’s Energy Division Staff November 2008 Interim Claim Report noted above in endnote 27.