New legislation could clear the path toward a sustainable strategy for storing spent nuclear fuel. Complexities and disagreements, however, might scuttle the effort.
The Blue Ribbon Commission’s best answer for the nuclear waste dilemma.
of extraneous things, whether they be political or other issues.”
Of course, nuclear waste policy is an intensely political subject, and the fedcorp would need people capable of managing the public-interest aspects of the corporation’s mission.
Some witnesses speaking before the BRC advocated having representatives of the public on the fedcorp board. Others suggest this might be unnecessary, and that simply ensuring proper regulatory oversight by the NRC and EPA would satisfy the need to ensure fair and impartial review of the corporation’s actions. “Remember, any decision [the board members] make is going to be under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires them to engage the public and the environmental groups that might be concerned,” Bailey says. “So it’s going to be a very public process.”
Also, last year’s Voinovich bill specified that the National Association of Utility Regulatory Commissioners (NARUC) would contribute two members to the proposed board of directors. This provision was intended to ensure the interests of customers and state governments are represented in the fedcorp’s decisions.
Step 3: Independent Funding
Assuring the continuity of funding from year to year is the most compelling reason to create a new entity that has direct access to the annual revenues from the Nuclear Waste Fund. Without such funding, consistent progress on construction of a repository can’t move forward at a reliable pace. It’s important for public reassurance and to support the huge, long-term financial commitments involved in constructing a spent-fuel repository—and not let the constantly shifting political winds in Washington affect those commitments.
The Nuclear Waste Fund has been the designated repository for ratepayer and utility fees since 1982, with accrued funds (allocated within the federal budget) of about $25 billion, and annual payments of about $750 million. To date, about $10 billion has been spent toward the construction of a permanent repository, mostly on Yucca Mountain.
Both the corpus of the Nuclear Waste Fund and the ongoing ratepayer payments logically might become the principal financial assets of a nuclear waste fedcorp. But transferring either accrued funds or annual contributions to a new fedcorp entity isn’t a trivial matter. For one thing, the Nuclear Waste Fund is earmarked for a permanent repository—as opposed to other options, such as interim storage or on-site casks, for example. Allowing the fedcorp to pursue the most pragmatic approach might require some legislative changes in the fund’s charter.
But perhaps more importantly, the fund presents a difficult budgeting matter for Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The issue has caused difficulties for previous efforts at reforming the way the federal government manages the Nuclear Waste Fund. In April 2006, DOE Secretary Samuel Bodman proposed an ambitious plan for managing nuclear spent-fuel and high-level waste, and that plan ran aground reportedly in part because OMB objected to transferring dollars from the Nuclear Waste Fund out of the federal balance sheet. “Funding reform is necessary to correct a technical budgetary problem that has acted as a disincentive to adequate funding,” Bodman stated.
The issue hasn’t improved since 2006. In testimony before the BRC