For decades, global uranium suppliers have been providing low cost reactor fuel in plentiful supplies. However the market is changing, and nuclear fuel prices are set to increase. Some plants will...
The Blue Ribbon Commission’s best answer for the nuclear waste dilemma.
in February, Mike Telson, DOE’s former chief financial officer, said his budget committee and the OMB had engaged in “Talmudic” discussions of this issue—implying such discussions were complex and could’ve gone on forever. Likewise Joe Hezir, a senior official at OMB for decades, explained that budgeting rules have become more restrictive and adverse in the context of transferring funds to a fedcorp. He said:
Such budget conflicts, however, aren’t necessarily deal killers for funding a spent-fuel fedcorp. Bailey of TVA, for example, argues that the $25 billion corpus of the Nuclear Waste Fund isn’t immediately needed to initiate a fedcorp. Annual ratepayer fees would be adequate to get the fedcorp started, and the government could transfer the corpus of the fund to the fedcorp books later—or even leave the fund where it is, and use that fund in situ as an asset to secure bonds issued for financing the fedcorp’s work.
Step 4: Defined Liabilities
The major liability that arises in creating a fedcorp involves the federal government’s failure to meet its obligations under the NWPA to assume responsibility for managing spent fuel beginning in 1998. Several utilities and state regulatory agencies have successfully sued the government for compensation arising from its violation and their additional costs for onsite spent-fuel storage. Exposure to this liability would prove problematic for a spent-fuel fedcorp.
In his BRC testimony, Phil Sewell, senior vice president of USEC, reinforced the need to be precise in identifying liabilities and assets as a key component of a making a new fedcorp successful. Further, Bailey of TVA says that no matter where the responsibility lands, paying the federal government’s damages from the waste fund would be indefensible from a legal and policy standpoint. “Essentially [it would be] asking the utilities to pay for their own lawsuit victory,” he says. “Because the money they’re taking is the money we’re paying in. That makes no sense at all.”
And indeed, a federal court in 2002 ruled that settlements from these suits must come out of the Department of Treasury judgment fund, rather than from the Nuclear Waste Fund.
But a fedcorp could also find itself holding the bag for other federal liabilities. For example, DOE has spent more than $7 billion on Yucca Mountain, and that work carries certain liabilities and responsibilities. Arguably they rest with DOE, and not a new entity without any involvement at Yucca Mountain.
If a fedcorp is created, however, then at some point in the future it will assume liability under the NWPA for the federal obligation to take spent nuclear fuel. So in defining fedcorp’s liabilities, policy makers will need to establish a reasonable timeline during which NWPA liabilities transfer to the fedcorp.
Step 5: Collaborative Approach
The existing siting process, established by Congress in 1987, hasn’t worked. Instead, it has generated strong opposition from the State of Nevada, led by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.). Also, problems that were unknown when the Yucca Mountain site was selected—including water intrusion and cracks in the mountain—have raised issues about its appropriateness as a repository that must,