One popular model in electric utility restructuring assumes a fully competitive merchant segment providing retail energy services. These "retail energy service companies," or RESCOs, would offer services described as heating, cooling, ventilation, lighting, drive power, information, and communications.
Sound bites from state and federal regulators.
Electric Restructuring. North Dakota opens investigation on electric utility restructuring, asking how direct access might affect state utility customers, given the relatively small number of large commercial users. Case No. PU-439-96-54, Feb. 20, 1996 (N.D.P.S.C.).
Gas Storage Costs.
Joseph F. Schuler, Jr.
Consumer advocates, utility chiefs, regulators, and analysts offered conflicting visions of retail competition's future at NASUCA's 1996 Capitol Hill Conference.
The National Association of State Consumer Advocates ( NASUCA) conference, "Restructuring the Electric Industry: What Are the Costs and Benefits to Consumers?," was held on February 29 and March 1 in the Rayburn House Office Building. The event was co-sponsored by Rep.
Kenneth W. Costello
The debate over restructuring the electric industry has encompassed a revisiting of the traditional rate-of-return (ROR) pricing model. Parties of widely divergent interests increasingly advocate alternatives. Under the label "performance-based regulation," these new pricing models share the objective of strengthening incentives for electric utilities incentives to pursue some specified "socially desirable" outcome.
Comparing Nonprice Terms in Utility
Filings Against FERC's Pro Forma Tariffs
AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT, THE VARIATIONS REFLECT THE HISTORIC TENSION BETWEEN NATIVE LOAD AND WHOLESALE TRANSACTIONS.
Stephen L. Teichler
Two power pools (em one existing, the other inchoate (em have announced that they will file tariffs to price electric transmission as the difference in spot prices in the generation and consuming markets.
Jeffrey S. Hitchings
On May 31, 1995, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued its Statement of Policy in Docket No. PL94-4-000, Pricing Policy for New and Existing Facilities Constructed by Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines.1 In that decision, the FERC sought to provide upfront rate certainty, thereby giving pipelines and shippers a firm basis for making decisions on large-scale investments.
But is that objective realistic?
Richard D. Cudahy
Ah, the wonders of competition! Out with waste, in with efficiency. The prospects are exciting. So why look back wistfully?
If there is anything more abhorrent than wife-beating and drug abuse, surely it must be monopoly. Monopoly is un-American: To the economist it represents the very state of original sin. To the courts it ranks with conspiracy. Monopoly promises economic waste, throttled production, obscene profits, and naked power (em all rolled into one. Consider what used to be called the "public utilities." In that sphere, regulated monopoly flourished for many years.
Bruce W. Radford
Lately I'm reading up on the new Telecommunications Act. Last week I printed a copy from the Internet and stuffed it in my briefcase. Each night on the train I give it a go and skim a few sections.
The new law unabashedly favors competition over regulation, but appoints state commissions (PUCs) to certify when that competition may be deemed effective enough to open markets. Thus, the PUCs will take at least one last shot at managing markets before they relax regulation for competitive services.
Ruth K. Kreschmer and Agustin J. Ros
The authors asked pipelines
and LDCs how they used storage.
Leasing activity proved a surprise.
Since deregulation, the natural gas industry has seen tremendous changes in every sector. Competitive pressures have reorganized business strategies so much that only those firms that adapt will survive. One area that stands ripe for change is the natural gas storage market.
Why build gas storage fields?