Stan Hadley, Eric Hirst, and Lester Baxter
Giving up today's customer to retail wheeling could help cut losses tomorrow.
Estimates of stranded investment for U.S. investor-owned electric utilities (IOUs) range from as little as $20 billion to as much as $500 billion (em more than double the shareholder equity in U.S. utilities.
Agustin Ros, John L. Domagalski, and Philip R. O'Connor
Investors are taking stock
of utility exposure to price competition.The utility trade press and even the general financial press have featured the views of regulators, utility executives, legislators, and various consumer advocates on the stranded-cost question. Stranded costs easily represent the most contentious issue facing the electric industry as it moves to an era of competition.
One popular model in electric utility restructuring assumes a fully competitive merchant segment providing retail energy services. These "retail energy service companies," or RESCOs, would offer services described as heating, cooling, ventilation, lighting, drive power, information, and communications.
Sound bites from state and federal regulators.
Electric Restructuring. North Dakota opens investigation on electric utility restructuring, asking how direct access might affect state utility customers, given the relatively small number of large commercial users. Case No. PU-439-96-54, Feb. 20, 1996 (N.D.P.S.C.).
Gas Storage Costs.
Joseph F. Schuler, Jr.
Consumer advocates, utility chiefs, regulators, and analysts offered conflicting visions of retail competition's future at NASUCA's 1996 Capitol Hill Conference.
The National Association of State Consumer Advocates ( NASUCA) conference, "Restructuring the Electric Industry: What Are the Costs and Benefits to Consumers?," was held on February 29 and March 1 in the Rayburn House Office Building. The event was co-sponsored by Rep.
Kenneth W. Costello
The debate over restructuring the electric industry has encompassed a revisiting of the traditional rate-of-return (ROR) pricing model. Parties of widely divergent interests increasingly advocate alternatives. Under the label "performance-based regulation," these new pricing models share the objective of strengthening incentives for electric utilities incentives to pursue some specified "socially desirable" outcome.
Comparing Nonprice Terms in Utility
Filings Against FERC's Pro Forma Tariffs
AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT, THE VARIATIONS REFLECT THE HISTORIC TENSION BETWEEN NATIVE LOAD AND WHOLESALE TRANSACTIONS.
Stephen L. Teichler
Two power pools (em one existing, the other inchoate (em have announced that they will file tariffs to price electric transmission as the difference in spot prices in the generation and consuming markets.
Jeffrey S. Hitchings
On May 31, 1995, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued its Statement of Policy in Docket No. PL94-4-000, Pricing Policy for New and Existing Facilities Constructed by Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines.1 In that decision, the FERC sought to provide upfront rate certainty, thereby giving pipelines and shippers a firm basis for making decisions on large-scale investments.
But is that objective realistic?
Richard D. Cudahy
Ah, the wonders of competition! Out with waste, in with efficiency. The prospects are exciting. So why look back wistfully?
If there is anything more abhorrent than wife-beating and drug abuse, surely it must be monopoly. Monopoly is un-American: To the economist it represents the very state of original sin. To the courts it ranks with conspiracy. Monopoly promises economic waste, throttled production, obscene profits, and naked power (em all rolled into one. Consider what used to be called the "public utilities." In that sphere, regulated monopoly flourished for many years.