Become a PUF Member Organization

Fortnightly Magazine - May 15 1995

Credit Parameters in Flux: When Assets are Liabilities

The question I am asked most frequently is "Who will emerge as the 'winners' and 'losers' among today's electric utility companies?" The short answer is painfully simple. The winners will offer the best prices (a.k.a., the low-cost producers). The losers will be unable to cut prices to meet the market (a.k.a., the high-cost producers).

Unfortunately, real-world answers rarely come in black and white. The electric utility industry enjoys less pricing flexibility than one might imagine.

Byline: 
Dan Scotto
Read Entire Article

It Ain't in There: The Cost of Capital Does Not Compensate for Stranded-cost Risk

Electric utilities now face the risk that existing assets, costs, or contract commitments may be "stranded" by increased competition, leaving shareholders rather than customers to bear the costs. Have shareholders already been compensated for this risk?

Some argue that shareholders have automatically been compensated for this risk by an allowed rate of return equal to the cost of equity capital determined in efficient capital markets.1 If so, forcing shareholders to bear stranded costs may seem fair.

Byline: 
A. Lawrence Kolbe and William B. Tye
Read Entire Article

Stranded Investment Surcharges: Inequitable and Inefficient

Retail competition will render a substantial fraction of existing electric utility plant worthless. Some estimates are so large that the question of compensation for these so-called "stranded investments" overshadows debate on the value of retail competition. Advocates of compensation frequently appeal to a "regulatory compact." They claim that this compact justifies compensation for utilities on grounds of fairness. The case for fairness, however, is badly flawed. Moreover, compensation may adversely affect the efficiency of markets in which competition is emerging.

Byline: 
Robert J. Michaels
Read Entire Article
V