Known Knowns, Known Unknowns, Unknown Unknowns
Steve Mitnick has authored five books on the economics, history, and people of the utilities industries. While in the consulting practice leadership of McKinsey & Co. and Marsh & McLennan, he advised utility leaders. He led a transmission development company and was a New York Governor’s chief energy advisor. Mitnick was an expert witness appearing before utility regulatory commissions of six states, D.C., FERC, and in Canada, and taught microeconomics, macroeconomics, and statistics at Georgetown University.
How much is enough? That's so often the central question for those considering investments in our national defense. Along with secondary questions of nearly equal importance, such as, should we invest in this particular defense program? Or that one instead?
And such as, when should we invest in a program? Now? When what we know about the need, to shore up a certain capability, is far less than complete. Or later? When we're likely to learn more about the need's criticality.
Though, putting off the decision until then might itself be a catastrophic choice. If a risk turns real sooner than anticipated.
This is the framework the defense community uses amid myriad risks and uncertainties about them. With huge consequences for the nation's safety. But also, with real consequences for taxpayers' pocketbooks.
Is this a framework we can similarly use when considering investments in our utility infrastructure? Would it provide us a compass with which we can better navigate through regulatory proceedings replete with sharply competing views about an infrastructure proposal's need and efficacy?
Known and Unknown Unknowns
I first heard these questions while working in the Office of the Secretary of Defense circa 1975. The President was Gerald Ford, and the Defense Secretary was Donald Rumsfeld, who would serve again in that capacity a quarter century later under President George W. Bush.