The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has denied a petition for rehearing filed by the City of Morgan City, LA, contesting the ability of the Rural Utilities Service (RUS), formerly the Rural Electrification Administration (REA), to interfere in the city's condemnation of the service territory of a rural electric cooperative (Case No. 93-4295).
Stranded costs are those costs that electric utilities are currently permitted to recover through their rates but whose recovery may be impeded or prevented by the advent of competition in the industry. Estimates of these costs run from the tens to the hundreds of billions of dollars. Should regulators permit utilities to recover stranded costs while they take steps to promote competition in the electric power industry?
Retail competition will render a substantial fraction of existing electric utility plant worthless. Some estimates are so large that the question of compensation for these so-called "stranded investments" overshadows debate on the value of retail competition. Advocates of compensation frequently appeal to a "regulatory compact." They claim that this compact justifies compensation for utilities on grounds of fairness. The case for fairness, however, is badly flawed. Moreover, compensation may adversely affect the efficiency of markets in which competition is emerging.
Electric utilities now face the risk that existing assets, costs, or contract commitments may be "stranded" by increased competition, leaving shareholders rather than customers to bear the costs. Have shareholders already been compensated for this risk?
Some argue that shareholders have automatically been compensated for this risk by an allowed rate of return equal to the cost of equity capital determined in efficient capital markets.1 If so, forcing shareholders to bear stranded costs may seem fair.
The question I am asked most frequently is "Who will emerge as the 'winners' and 'losers' among today's electric utility companies?" The short answer is painfully simple. The winners will offer the best prices (a.k.a., the low-cost producers). The losers will be unable to cut prices to meet the market (a.k.a., the high-cost producers).
Unfortunately, real-world answers rarely come in black and white. The electric utility industry enjoys less pricing flexibility than one might imagine.
For better or worse, deregulation is now a factor in the electric utility industry. As a general proposition, deregulation makes for increased competition, which in turn will trim costs for consumers. Deregulation of the electric industry means that utilities face the prospect of freezing or reducing rates to retain market share. Stranded investments and the burdens of above-market supply contracts and construction and development contracts (especially nuclear-related contracts) will place additional pressure on these utilities and further reduce their revenue.
a comparable cost. But what, exactly, are those "different uses"?
After Congress enacted the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, the electric utility industry focused considerable attention on what seemed the key provisions of the acid rain program: e.g., emission allowance trading. In contrast, the highly technical, seemingly innocuous continuous emission monitoring (CEM) provision received scant attention (em only a few engineers took notice. We now know that emission trading and other supposed key provisions had only a modest impact on utilities.
NARUC Goes on Record
In a recent article, "Why Taxes Do Distort Emissions Trading" (Feb.15, 1995), Stanley I. Garnett II, chief financial officer of Allegheny Power System, Inc. discusses a legislative proposal currently promoted by his firm and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). This proposal seeks to amend current Internal Revenue Service policy on federal tax treatment of the proceeds of emission allowance sales.
Appliance Disservice
Gordon Canning's article, "Entering the Appliance Repair Business" (Feb. 1, 1995), contains several inaccuracies. First, Mr. Canning asserts that "the residential customer views the utility as a preferred provider." This is not a universal given. Residential customers only view a utility as a preferred provider of appliance service if the utility is allowed to engage in nonutility business activities and to subsidize these services below fair-market value.