The prospect of deregulation has induced a wave of mergers among electric utilities. Most of these mergers would fail an antitrust review because, by combining generation assets of interconnected utilities, they have substantially reduced potential competition in generation.
Since the federal Court of Appeals decision in the Calvert Cliffs case over 25 years ago, no power plant may be built without a thorough socioeconomic impact statement. Yet, schemes to alter the entire supply system of a state - or even the nation - are currently proposed with only cursory attention to socioeconomic consequences.
Genco Risk: "Location, Location, Location"Vinod Dar's recent article, "Competition, Convergence . . . and Cashflow? The Power Business in the Next 20 Years" (Apr. 1, 1996, p. 31), highlighted some of the risks inherent in investments in new power generation plants in a restructured electric industry.
I don't know about you, but the Internet is driving me carzy. Every week I discover a half-dozen new home pages to add to my reading list. Some may view NetscapeÔ as an investment play. I see it as drama.
As a magazine editor (em someone who gets paid to follow the news (em I feel guilty if I don't click on every link and download every file. I call it the "obligation to surf." And the problem grows worse as more government agencies post their decisions online.
One popular model in electric utility restructuring assumes a fully competitive merchant segment providing retail energy services. These "retail energy service companies," or RESCOs, would offer services described as heating, cooling, ventilation, lighting, drive power, information, and communications.
Although the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a December 1995 order (Docket No. CP93-258-007) giving Mojave Pipeline Co. a green light to expand into California, the planned Northward Expansion Facilities have been tabled. The reason: A three-year delay caused by jurisdictional disputes between the FERC and the California Public Utilities Commission, as well as problems involving the FERC's contract-demand reduction policy, caused Mojave to lose its projected customer base.
The debate over restructuring the electric industry has encompassed a revisiting of the traditional rate-of-return (ROR) pricing model. Parties of widely divergent interests increasingly advocate alternatives. Under the label "performance-based regulation," these new pricing models share the objective of strengthening incentives for electric utilities incentives to pursue some specified "socially desirable" outcome.
Two power pools (em one existing, the other inchoate (em have announced that they will file tariffs to price electric transmission as the difference in spot prices in the generation and consuming markets.
Citing heightened competition and lower earnings in the state's local exchange telephone market, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has frozen price caps for local exchange carriers (LECs) for most noncompetitive local services, and has suspended the 5-percent "x-factor" services for an intermediate level of competition.
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has approved a proposal by Sierra Pacific Power Co. to construct a 345-kilovolt overhead transmission line, but not simply to gain access to low-cost power. Instead, the CPUC appeared to emphasize concern over reliability.
Sierra Pacific, involved in merger plans with The Washington Water Power Co., had cited access to low-cost power from the Bonneville Power Administration as an important reason to build the transmission line.