Filings Against FERC's Pro Forma Tariffs
AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT, THE VARIATIONS REFLECT THE HISTORIC TENSION BETWEEN NATIVE LOAD AND WHOLESALE TRANSACTIONS.
In a case reviewing standards for integrated resource planning (IRP) set out in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct), the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) has recognized that changes in the natural gas industry, combined with an evolution toward competition (both upstream and inside the city gate), "will make gas IRP a less-necessary commission function in order to insure least-cost gas service."
The PUC said most of its existing regulations were consistent with the federal standards; however, it rejected the EPAct standards regarding guaranteed profitability an
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has declined to adopt standards in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct) that concern integrated resource planning and energy efficiency for electric and gas utilities, exempt wholesale generators and affiliated transactions, and investment in foreign utilities.
The beleaguered Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) has a new assailant (em U.S. Rep. Cliff Stearns (R-FL). Stearns's bipartisan legislation, H.R. 2562, the "Ratepayer Protection Act," proposes repeal of section 210 of PURPA, which requires electric utilities to purchase power at avoided costs.
Bunker Hill. Gettysburg. Pearl Harbor. Iwo Jima. The Cold War. Each of these famous conflicts resonates in our history books. Despite the end of the Cold War, we may face another battle, this time between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the states over jurisdiction.
For the partners in a utility merger, the celebration must wait. After opening the most delicate of dialogues, and then negotiating the price and closing the deal, the merger partners must yet gain the approval of regulators. The application may lie sealed in its FedEx pouch, safely on its way to Washington.
Differences of opinion make for good horse races and bad jokes about economists, and those who are studying the recent wave of electric utility merger announcements have not let us down. Some of these economists optimistically believe that the mergers act as forces for competition, since they will combine corporate assets and staffs to bolster operating efficiency and market acumen at the merged companies. Other economists, who see transmission as the root of monopoly power, are more pessimistic.
The competitive transformations of the natural gas and telecommunications industries are over a decade in the making. By contrast, competition in the electricity industry is still emerging. Special interests have defeated many proposed competitive reforms. For example, in 1988 the FERC failed in its attempt to adopt regulations to encourage competitive bidding and independent power producers (IPPs).1 Similarly, decades of forceful industry opposition delayed open access in bulk-power markets.