Rapid developments in the electric industry, especially in wholesale markets, have prompted the Virginia State Corporation Commission (SCC) to extend its review of a utility's plans to add to its transmission system. Appalachian Power Co., an operating member of the American Electric Power (AEP) system, had asked the SCC for authority to construct a 765-kilovolt transmission line between substations in West Virginia and Virginia.
The Idaho Public Utilities Commission (PUC) has approved a plan by Utah Power and Light Co., partner in a merger with PacifiCorp, to offer its largest customer, Monsanto, reduced rates as well as an option to arrange for the delivery of third-party power when prices fall below state levels.
The Michigan Public Service Commission (PSC) has upheld a 1995 decision permitting Sault Electric Co. to switch to a price-cap rate plan. The plan allows the utility to roll its existing power-supply adjustment clause into base rates to set initial rates; later rate reductions are permitted with only 30 days written notice to the PSC (see, Edison Sault Electric Co., 164 PUR4th 1 (Mich.P.S.C. 1995)).
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has directed the state's electric and gas utilities to implement a two-year pilot allowing applicants such as residential real estate developers to design distribution facilities for their projects. (Currently, utilities are responsible for designing distribution plant.) In limiting the experiment to residential projects, the CPUC rejected allegations that the limitation would unfairly deny all ratepayers the immediate benefit of savings associated with the "unbundling of engineering costs" for distribution plant.
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has declined to adopt standards in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct) that concern integrated resource planning and energy efficiency for electric and gas utilities, exempt wholesale generators and affiliated transactions, and investment in foreign utilities.
As this snapshot look at the seven utility mergers announced since January 1995 demonstrates, traditional patterns are no longer being followed. A number of the announced transactions did not fit squarely into either the merger-of-equals model (little or no premium, fairly even equity and board split, CEO succession plan) or the acquisition model (high premium, disparate equity and board split, no CEO succession plan).
What are the essential characteristics of the system of governance that will be required for a new, North American electric industry with interconnected and interdependent transmission networks and trading areas?
Electric transmission networks are natural monopolies, as are the many independent network
control systems that coordinate the use of generators and loads and preserve system reliability.
Nearly three years on from the Yellow Book,1 after many long hours and thousands (em if not millions (em of pages, and following much bitter debate (linked with some murky politics), the California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) by a 3-2 majority has at last published an Order2 to introduce competition for retail customers.
The decision contains four main proposals:
s market structure
s access for custo
As electric restructuring spreads around the nation and the world, the idea of a "PoolCo" spot market (pool) gains credence. Pools already exist in England, Australia, Norway, Alberta, and Argentina. On December 20,1 the California Public Utilities Commission formally proposed a pool, called the California Power Exchange, to begin operation as of January 1, 1998.
Nowhere are the failings of traditional utility regulation more evident than on Long Island. The New York Public Service Commission (PSC) has raised rates for the Long Island Lighting Co. (LILCO) 31 percent since 1989. Rates are now over twice the national average (em the highest in the continental United States. Meanwhile, Long Island's economy has been ravaged by defense cutbacks that have erased 100,000 jobs (em a 10-percent drop in employment.