RTEP

Bad Day at Black Oak

Beware even the best of attempts at apportioning grid rights and costs.

Several recent complaints involving PJM and now at FERC pose fundamental questions on how regulators and grid operators should attempt to price and allocate grid rights and costs. Is the transmission network a public asset, with costs that must be apportioned on principles of equity? Or, rather, is transmission an instrument of commerce, to be priced so as to maximize trade?

One RTO, Two Systems

By trying to placate regulated states—letting utilities “opt out” from its capacity market—PJM finds its RPM idea under fire.

While the PJM Interconnection has made no major changes to its prototype capacity market since it proposed the idea a year ago in August, and though it has won a tacit OK from federal regulators for many of the plan’s key elements, don’t expect to see a slam dunk when the time comes for a final review of the controversial idea, known as the Reliability Pricing Model.

A Candy-Coated Grid

Incentives for transmission investment could boost postage-stamp pricing over license-plate rates.

FERC proposed a new set of regulations, under the new section 219 of the Federal Power Act, explaining in broad outline how it might approve generous financial incentives for new investments in transmission—incentives once dubbed as “candy.” As of mid-January, the new NOPR had spawned more industry comment than just about any other FERC proposal in recent memory.

Coal's Raw Deal

The bias in RTO markets, and how FERC might fix it.

RTO practice creates less risk and uncertainty over the nominal short-term wholesale price of power, but more risk and uncertainty over the long-term cost of transmission. That spells trouble for the coal-fired plant, sited far off at the mine mouth, needing long-haul transmission over a long-enough term to pay back the capital costs.

Breaking the Gridlock

A proposal to remove the bottlenecks on grid investment.

The lack of transmission investment transcends the usual culprits, pointing to a serious flaw in market structure.

Reliability Wars

Power System Planning: Who gets paid (and how much) for backing up the system?

“Confining transmission projects to FTR payments is like confining generators to energy-only payments,” says Ed Krapels, the electric industry consultant from Boston who helped dream up the initial idea of the Neptune project. These words speak volumes on what’s happening in today’s power industry, and on what the ISOs and RTOs are trying to achieve, not only for merchant-grid projects but for merchant generation and system reliability.

Commission Watch

ISO New England dares to dream, again.

Commission Watch

ISO New England dares to dream, again.

ISO New England (ISO-NE) wants to become a regional transmission organization (RTO). But just the idea-prior to any official filing at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)-has come under attack. ISO-NE is going to find rough waters ahead, despite a three-year effort aimed at a smooth transition to becoming an RTO. And now with the Oct. 31 filing of the 2,000-plus-page RTO proposal at FERC, the stage is set for these battles to be fought, again.

Commission Watch

PJM would dictate grid expansion, even if not needed for reliability, and then push the cost of the upgrades on those who use them the most.


PJM would dictate grid expansion, even if not needed for reliability, and then push the cost of the upgrades on those who use them the most.

Chairman Pat Wood and his Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) may well have given up on attempts to impose a standard market design (SMD) on the electric utility industry, but that doesn't mean the nation's grid system operators won't try the same thing.